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Police Retention and Storage of Evidence in England and Wales 
 
Abstract 
Central to the operation of the appellate system, is the ability of individuals who claim that 
their conviction is in error, to revisit and re-examine evidence gathered during the 
investigation, as well as that relied upon at their trial. High-profile miscarriages of justice 
have often only been remedied when there has been defence access to materials post-
conviction. There is also an imperative for forces to retain evidence in investigations where no 
perpetrator has been detected or convicted, to facilitate cold case reviews. In order to give 
effect then to an appellate system and enable cold case reviews, evidence needs to be retained, 
and properly stored. If materials are not retained and stored correctly, then re-investigations 
are rendered impossible. Retention is especially critical in respect of physical materials that 
could be subject to forensic examination. With the progress of science and technology, and the 
interpretation of results, it is essential that such physical (and now, often digital) materials are 
retained for future (re)evaluation. From analysis of responses to a Freedom of Information 
request to all police forces in England and Wales, and qualitative interviews with criminal 
justice stakeholders, this article examines the retention and storage of materials, and considers 
the operation and future of the Forensic Archive Ltd (FAL). It details a worrying picture of 
inconsistency, with confusion over what should be retained, and how. It concludes that justice 
demands that we accept that the proper retention and storage of materials is fundamental to 
the fair and effective operation of our criminal justice system, and ensures that the Court of 
Appeal can fulfil its remit in addressing wrongful convictions and forces can pursue justice in 
cold cases.  
 
Introduction 
Criminal investigations undertaken by police forces can result in the collation of a huge volume 
of materials, both physical and digital. Reports state that today, even a ‘run of the mill’ 
investigation can generate tens of thousands of pages of data downloaded from multiple digital 
devices (see House of Commons 2018, paras 52-61). As well as often copious paper documents, 
seized (and created) materials can range from microscopic particles to large vehicles or even 
body parts. It is vital for the operation of the criminal justice process that the police not only 
gather all possible evidence that could assist with the identification of individuals involved, but 
also shed light on the potential criminal liability of those identified suspects. Following any 
resulting conviction, or a decision to close an unsolved case, there must be ongoing retention 
and storage of these materials. In this paper, we examine the police retention and storage of 
materials collated during a criminal investigation. 1 In light of huge variance in retention 
practices across the 43 police forces of England and Wales, in 2017 the National Police Chiefs 
Council (NPCC) issued new national guidance. The results of a Freedom of Information 
Request to all 43 police forces; a series of stakeholder interviews, and a survey of relevant 
actors within the criminal justice system on the retention of investigative materials, together 
demonstrate that adherence to these rules appears to be ‘patchy’ at best. The paper thus 
examines whether this new national guidance has the potential to resolve the problem of the 
loss and destruction of material, materials that are critical in ensuring justice if the criminal 
justice process has resulted in a wrongful conviction, or a case has failed to be resolved.2  
 
The Present Study 
This research was inspired by a case where resolution has not yet been reached.  Roger Kearney 
was convicted of the murder of Paula Poolton in 2010. Secret lover to Poolton, found dead in 
the boot of her own car, Kearney was convicted on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution 
case described a high level of interaction between the victim, who had been stabbed, and her 
attacker and yet no forensic evidence was ever located, which incriminated Kearney. When the 
conviction was reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC),3 seven years 
into his life sentence, advances in DNA techniques meant scientists identified new tests to be 
undertaken on crime scene samples, assumed to be in storage. But investigations by the CCRC 
discovered that exhibits had been lost, contaminated and destroyed. 4  This case initially 
provoked one overriding question: what rules or regulations are there for the post-conviction 
retention of material gathered during a police investigation? From this, there arose a series of 
sub-questions: if rules have been breached, is legal redress available? What retention policy is 
in place for trial transcripts post-conviction, needed to provide context to any re-investigation? 
Which agency bears responsibility for implementing the retention rules?  Is it proportionate 
and sustainable to retain material and should practical issues, such as size or value, be 
                                                          
1 We are assuming the efficient, effective and assiduous collection of all potential evidentially valuable material, 
(and its subsequent disclosure) an assumption that itself is contentious, but this controversy lies beyond the remit 
of this particular paper. 
2 Increasingly, such unresolved serious cases must be subject to a ‘cold case’ review. However, this process will 
not be the focus of this paper, albeit most of the arguments will be exactly the same as those important for 
addressing wrongful convictions. 
3 The statutory body with the power to refer cases, which may be wrongful convictions, back to the Court of 
Appeal.  
4 Roger Kearney continues to protest his innocence while serving a life sentence in prison, see: Conviction: 
Murder at the Station, BBC, 2016. 
considered? Is material generated by scientists treated differently to items held by the police; 
and has there been an impact on retention with the closure of the national Forensic Science 
Service?  
 
A Freedom of Information (FOI) request sent in October 2017 to the 43 police forces of 
England and Wales (to which all forces responded), sought to determine their policies for 
decisions upon what material should be kept post-conviction, and for how long. The Freedom 
of Information question posed was:  
 
“Is there a designated length of time for which [force name inserted] and laboratories 
you instruct, both internal and external, retain physical material gathered during police 
investigations in respect of convicted crimes?  If there is a divergence of policy 
according to crime type, please provide clarification. The phrase “physical material” 
above refers to all objects and items which are exhibited as part of both the “used 
material” at trial AND the “unused material”, not subsequently used at trial.” 
 
Differing language used to represent ‘exhibits’, ‘material’ and ‘information’ exacerbates 
confusion with police officers and crime scene examiners often using the word ‘exhibit’ as a 
descriptor for all items seized. Every single item is given a unique number prefixed by the 
initials of the person who found, or created it, during a search, examination or some other 
process (Butler, 2016). That number allows continuity to be demonstrated, to show that every 
exhibit is logged, stored and shared appropriately. The word ‘exhibit’ may be unambiguous 
pre-trial but ambiguity can creep in post-conviction. Public – and arguably legal – 
understanding of the word ‘exhibit’ is more akin to something, which has been displayed 
publicly (in this context, display in court). For the sake of clarity, the use of the word ‘exhibit’ 
was avoided in gathering data for this research in an attempt to avoid this interpretation of the 
word.  Interviews with a range of criminal justice practitioners (N=18) were also conducted, 
transcribed, approved as accurate, and used to provide dynamic insight. Most interviewees gave 
permission to be named and are detailed in Table 2.   
 
Table 1. Interviewees - HERE 
 
Police Retention and Storage of Materials  
Pre-trial, evidence gathered during a criminal investigation is protected by legislation (Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, CPIA) and any police officer investigating alleged 
crimes has a duty to record and retain material, which may be relevant to an investigation. 
Supplementary Codes of Practice guide officers and police civilian staff in the execution of 
their duties in this regard. These of course are Codes of Practice and as such, an officer in 
breach of them cannot face criminal proceedings.5 The CPIA 1996 not only sets out the manner 
in which police officers are to record, retain (and destroy) material obtained in investigations 
but also extends to what should happen to that material post-conviction. Once material has been 
subject to examination, and perhaps used in any criminal proceedings as evidence, it is 
commonly referred to as an ‘exhibit’, which can refer to physical exhibits seized during, or 
created by, the police investigation which may, or may not, have been used during the trial. 
Crucially, it will include all those objects, which anyone seeking to challenge their conviction, 
through new scientific or expert work, will hope to access if they are to progress their case to 
the appellate stage (particularly if there was a failure to fully disclose all evidence pre-trial). 
Exhibits include, but are not restricted to, items gathered in the search of premises, crime scene 
or deposition site; audio and digital recordings, which may include police interviews; footage 
from public and private CCTV cameras; suspects’ and victims’ clothing; intimate swabs or 
tapings; photographs. The list is dynamic and covers any item at all collected pre-trial.  
 
The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) published national guidance in 2017 for police 
forces and forensic science providers on retention periods for material post-conviction but, as 
detailed below, only two forces appeared in 2018 to be aware of these guidelines. Because a 
successful appeal will almost always require fresh evidence (Roberts 2017), which may well 
be found in unused trial material, the decision on what is relevant and what should be kept has 
the potential to directly affect the operation of the Court of Appeal. In a review of the first ten 
years of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), a founding Commissioner 
commented: “Some of the clearest miscarriage of justice referred by the Commission have been 
where there has been fresh evidence to show that the jury convicted on a misleading, 
incomplete or simply wrong view of the relevant facts” (Elks, 2008). Clearly, the police 
retention of materials is crucial, and these materials must then be stored in such a way as to be 
discoverable, while also safe from destruction, loss or contamination.  
 
                                                          
5 See McCartney and Shorter (2019) for more on the problems that this raises.  
Police forces have always retained material generally classed as ‘property’, be it goods seized 
from police operations, or evidence gathered during a potential criminal investigation. 
Historically, it has been impossible to predict where such property might be stored by an 
individual force, and its location can often only be garnered by asking individual officers who 
may or may not know (officers frequently leave the force/retire and may take that knowledge 
with them). Yet similar guidelines to those in the CPIA concerning material pre-trial, create a 
framework post-conviction, which ought to be followed: exhibits will be safely packaged and 
stored securely, in a manner which prevents contamination and evidence degradation. While 
there are now NPCC guidelines, which are intended to give definitive rules on how long 
materials are retained for, there were a variety of potential sources of prior guidance (see Table 
1), to which police forces could refer when determining local policy. 
 
Table 2: Summary of National Retention Policies - HERE 
 
 
The Current Retention of Material Post-Conviction. 
The results reveal a catalogue of differing practice, with the majority apparently unaware of 
current guidance and the application, by a significant number of forces, of guidance (the so-
called ‘MoPI’ rules), designed for another purpose entirely – that of preventing crime and the 
better detection of crime through intelligence – which applies the wrong test and imposes an 
unnecessary archiving burden.  
 
In total (see Table 3), 36 forces (84%) referred to (a quartet of) national guidelines, 7 (16%) 
referred only to a policy defined by their own constabulary and 5 (12%) cited both. All four 
national guidelines mentioned were derived from the Criminal Procedure Investigations Act 
1996 (CPIA) by national police initiatives but differ in terms of the length of retention and the 
justification for retention.6  Reference to the four will be in the language used by forces: CPIA, 
MoPI, Forensics21 and NPCC Version 2.1.7 
 
Table 3: Summary of FOI Responses Tabulated by Force and Policy – HERE  
 
                                                          
6 The initiatives referred to here are the Association of Chief Police Officers and National Police Chiefs’ 
Council. 
7 NPCC V2.0 was completed in October 2017. V2.1 was issued in December 2017.  
The most commonly cited source of guidance, MoPI, was set by the police professional 
standards body, the College of Policing and sits within the CoP framework ‘Authorised 
Professional Practice’, which police officers and staff must follow (CoP 2018). MoPI, which 
specifically relates to ‘police records’, includes a section dedicated to Information 
Management: Retention, Review and Disposal and makes frequent references to data and 
intelligence, which can assist police in maintaining a proactive approach to policing: 
“Information collected for one policing purpose may have value to another” (MoPI, at 1.1.1). 
The aim of information gathering and sharing for intelligence purposes is, therefore, distinct 
from the aims of assisting the immediate investigation of specific incidents. As such, material 
which could point to the safety of an individual conviction – an exculpatory DNA result for 
example – may not be found in the paper records of the police information system designed to 
detect (to prevent, or disrupt) future criminality: “The primary purpose of review, retention and 
disposal procedures is to protect the public and help manage the risks posed by known 
offenders and other potentially dangerous people (ibid)”. 
 
The second most commonly cited policy was the CPIA 1996 Codes of Practice, which set out 
the “manner in which police officers are to record, retain and reveal to the prosecutor material 
obtained in investigations” (Ministry of Justice 2015: preamble). It also extends to what should 
happen to that material post-conviction (at 5.9). The Act helpfully defines the word ‘material’ 
as: 
  “material of any kind, including information and objects, which is obtained or 
 inspected in the course of a criminal investigation and which may be relevant to the 
 investigation. This includes not only material coming into the possession of the 
 investigator (such as documents seized in the course of searching premises) but 
 also material generated by him (such as interview records)” (at 2.1).  
 
A close reading of this paragraph is required when attempting to understand whether the 
drafter’s intention was to set out the policy around written source material – case files, 
interviews, statements etc., or whether it extends to physical items. The use of the word 
‘objects’ here is in addition to the word ‘information’ and as such suggests items beyond a 
paper-trail. It refers to physical exhibits seized during, or created by, the police investigation, 
which may, or may not, have been used during the trial. The Act imposes very clear duties for 
the disclosure officer to schedule and review all relevant material post-conviction:  
 
 “Where the accused is convicted, all material which may be relevant must be retained 
 at least until:  
 • the convicted person is released from custody, or discharged from hospital, in cases 
 where the court imposes a custodial sentence or a hospital order;  
• six months from the date of conviction, in all other cases” (at 5.9). 
 
Provision is also made for the retention of material in all cases where the convicted person is 
released from custody but a Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) investigation, into 
further possible appeals against conviction, is ongoing (at 5.10). The revised Attorney General 
Guidelines on Disclosure reinforce the principle that relevant material should be retained until 
the prisoner is released from custody stating that: 
  
“It may become apparent to an investigator that some material obtained in the course 
of an investigation, either because it was considered to be potentially relevant, or 
because it was inextricably linked to material that was relevant, is, in fact, incapable of 
impact. It is not necessary to retain such material, although the investigator should err 
on the side of caution in reaching that conclusion and should be particularly mindful of 
the fact that some investigations continue over some time and that what is incapable of 
impact may change over time. The advice of the prosecutor should be sought where 
appropriate.” (Attorney General 2013: para 25).  
 
The decision of course of what may be ‘relevant’, even if deferring to a prosecutor for advice, 
and ‘erring on the side of caution’, introduces a level of judgement and discretion for 
investigators.  
 
As previously mentioned, investigative material falls into two categories: that which has been 
used at trial and, everything else that was gathered during the police investigation (disclosed, 
and also that not disclosed to the defence). Judgement is required to determine the fate of every 
single item, leading to a precarious framework, which offers little guidance and requires 
interpretation by many individuals across all 43 forces. Typically, the responsibility rests with 
the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) of the case, as described by City of London Police: 
“anything post-conviction, for something serious, has to be the property of our SIO… If we 
were to review the property that we’ve got, we would consult the SIO” (Lekamwattage, 2018). 
It is therefore the decision of one investigator, not an expert in post-trial processes, with neither 
legal nor forensic science training. There is also no apparent monitoring or oversight of such 
decisions. It is clear from the account of police representatives that material is more likely to 
be considered relevant if it was used in court:  
 
 “For everything post-conviction, how important is it? Is it relevant and is there any 
 requirement to retain it? The stuff that is [relevant], will be kept for the duration of 
 that sentence; the stuff that isn’t will be disposed of if there’s no legal right to retain 
 it…. it’s all done on a case-by-case basis. It would be led by: ‘what have we done 
 with that item in the course of this investigation? Have we exhausted what we need 
 to do for the purposes, is there a requirement to hold on?” (Lekamwattage, 2018).   
 
Post-conviction, a successful appeal will most likely require fresh evidence (Roberts 2017),8 
which may well be found in unused trial evidence if it has been kept. The decision on what is 
relevant and what should be kept, therefore, is critical to the work of the Court of Appeal.    
 
The third most commonly cited policy, ‘Forensics 21’, was guidance originally issued by the 
forerunner of the College of Policing, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). This 
guidance was identified in 2016 as needing replacement (Home Office 2016: recommendation 
3) and indeed, is superseded by the NPCC guidelines. ‘Forensics21’ sets out guidance on the 
retention, storage and destruction of material, which has been submitted to a Forensic Service 
Provider (FSP). In so doing, it reminds investigators of the powers afforded to them by CPIA, 
MoPI and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): Section 22(1) of PACE states: 
“anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a 
requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary 
in all the circumstances”. The use of the word ‘may’ invests authorities with the power to retain 
anything seized for a criminal investigation but does not go so far as to impose seizure as a 
requirement – which would have been achieved by the word ‘shall’. Without this s.22 power, 
lawful owners could demand the return of an item used in a criminal prosecution and forces 
may use their discretion about the return of items, as the Director of Forensic Services, City of 
London Police described:  
                                                          
8 Research on the Court of Criminal Appeal demonstrates that as a proportion of successful appeals, ‘fresh 
evidence’ are far more prevalent than so-called ‘procedural error’ appeals. 
  
 “we do return some exhibits to victims’ families if they want them and it’s appropriate 
 for us to do so, with the caveat that they might be blood-stained, for example. We 
 offer to clean them first but sometimes they want them as they are” (Alexander, 2018).  
 
The least commonly cited, yet current policy, is the ‘NPCC Guidance Regarding the Storage, 
Retention and Destruction of Records and Materials that have been Seized for Forensic 
Examination’ Version 2.1. Just two forces – Staffordshire and North Wales – referred to this 
policy. The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) provides co-ordination, at a senior level, 
for operations and reform with a key function: the national operational implementation of 
standards and policy as set by the College of Policing and Government. NPCC 2.1 provides 
guidance for police forces and independent forensic science providers (FSPs) and covers 
records and materials (information and physical exhibits). It helpfully states that the guidance 
covers material and information recovered/seized by Law Enforcement Agencies as a result of 
investigation into criminal investigations, submitted to and retained by FSP, as well as those 
retained within law enforcement property stores. The Guidance refers to PACE (1984), CPIA 
(1996), the Human Tissue Act (2004), MoPI, the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012), 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000), Data Protection Act (2000) and Police Reform 
Act (2002).   
 
In a complementary survey sent to relevant actors within the criminal justice system, a former 
senior police officer reported “I doubt that there’s ever been a case where exhibits are kept 
properly”, while an experienced legal executive who works exclusively in criminal defence 
work described retention post-conviction as “…very hit and miss, very haphazard and varies 
drastically from police force to police force”. A civilian employee of a major police force 
described his own expectations of finding property safely stored within retention period 
guidelines as “variable”. A highly experienced solicitor described giving up on one murder 
case when blood-stained clothing, shoes and other material that could have been subjected to 
new DNA techniques could not be found, while another highly experienced solicitor said: “In 
my experience, [storage of material is] pretty inconsistent. Overall, the pattern is that it’s just 
not available… sometimes the record keeping is so poor that, even if it should exist people just 
can’t find [exhibits].” A scientist specialising in cold-case reviews with extensive experience 
of working with many forces commented: “I get the impression that, if cases were identified, 
even homicides, the exhibits aren’t kept… in sex offences, not a chance. I get the impression 
that they [police forces] are all doing something slightly different.” 
 
 
Scientific Material and the Forensic Archive   
The retention of scientific material nationally changed following the closure of the Forensic 
Science Service (FSS). Concern that archives would be fragmented upon closure of the FSS 
led to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommending in 2011, 
that “the existing archives must physically remain as a single, accessible resource” and that 
“there may be benefits in developing the FSS's archives further into a comprehensive national 
resource” (House of Commons 2011: paras 159 & 160). The Government were eventually 
persuaded to create a new facility, the Forensic Archive Ltd (FAL), as the storage solution to 
forensic files and scientific exhibits, which had to be kept in accordance with national policy.9 
Material held across various FSS laboratories and stores was brought together in vast hangars 
in the Midlands:  
  
 “There was a lot of material moved very quickly – between five and six million 
 case-files – so we had the existing site and we had to move all the material from the 
 laboratories, and we had another site in Birmingham… We had to set up lots of 
 brackets and shelves, we have five massive walk-in -24 [centigrade] freezers here” 
 (Fendley, 2018).   
 
These items, generally, only extended to that which can be described as the scientific ‘artefacts’ 
generated during lab work: slides, swabs, tapings, DNA extracts and the important ‘forensic 
file’ (‘case-file’) in which scientists recorded their endeavours. Bulky items such as clothing, 
shoes, weapons etc., had mostly been returned to be kept in police property stores, albeit several 
surprises included several skulls and other body parts including shod feet. In addition to case 
files and samples, the archive also holds supporting material such as validation and verification 
records relating to FSS scientific methods and techniques: 
 
                                                          
9 FAL is technically the same company as the FSS which underwent a name change to better reflect current 
activities. It also carries additional company responsibilities around issues such as pensions and assets.  
 “As we were winding the FSS down, in order to cause the least problems for the 
 criminal justice system, we were also looking at putting the archive together and 
 building that up, not just for the materials but also the infrastructure around it, because 
 we were dismantling the FSS infrastructure” (Fendley, 2018).   
 
The Government were urged to extend the transition period, with concerns across a range of 
issues, not least the security of these archived case-files and exhibits dating back to the 1930s. 
The closure of the FSS was however implemented at speed, with warnings unheeded, and in 
March 2012, the FSS closed its doors. The creation of FAL meant that most of the holdings at 
the FSS transferred across to FAL but one scientist interviewed maintained a more “orderly 
transition” would have avoided problems such as some police forces (presumably due to an 
absence of clear direction from ministers) deciding to take back historic material for fear of it 
being lost, only to lose it themselves:  
 
 “My issue is that the forces can just ask for those [FSS] files, because they’re their 
 materials now, and they can get them and do what they like with them… I know of at 
 least three cases, and I’m cross about this, where the particular forces involved have 
 requested the files and they’ve lost them” (Anon, 2018).   
 
A review by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in 2013 learned that 
some of the FSS databases and collections appeared to have been lost even before they had 
reached the archive,: “[the] 10,000 record Chorley analytical glass database [had] been lost to 
the forensic community” and “the FSS reference collections such as hair types, wood types etc 
are apparently no longer either available or organised.” (House of Commons, 2013: para 94). 
Similarly, a literature database, to be preserved by the Forensic Science Society, could not be 
accessed at the Home Office and data and references went missing (ibid). Other FSS collections 
were donated to alternate organisations; the firearms reference collection, for example, was 
sent to the Government-funded National Ballistics Intelligence Service. 
 
Calls for all scientific material, created by commercial FSPs in the post-FSS era, to also be held 
securely and centrally at FAL, also went unheeded. In 2011, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee had recommended that FSPs be allowed to send this material to 
FAL (which they then called the ‘National Forensic Archives’) but the Home Office did not 
consider it “appropriate during the transition to design a completely new archiving system 
encompassing material from private FSPs” (Home Office 2011: para 23). Instead, the Home 
Office placed the burden on police forces to archive their forensic files and materials, for which, 
arguably, they had neither the expertise nor budget, and until NPCC 2.1, no national policy for 
this new police role.  
 
Until February 2019, no new material was therefore added to the archive. However, this plan 
to only house exhibits existing when created, became untenable when the administrators of a 
bankrupt private provider of digital forensic services, attempted to ‘sell’ back to police and 
security services, the files held by the company. The collapse of FTS (Forensic 
Telecommunications Services) in 2017, with debts of more than £1million, thus required 
emergency measures be adopted (Armitage, 2017):  
  
 “That was a bit of a crisis: it happened very rapidly and forces weren’t aware. The 
 first thing they knew was that the liquidator had seized all the material. Because it 
 was digitised, it just looked like computer hardware and it might be worth some 
 money. We’ve ended up with that material and we’re cataloguing it and adding it to 
 our archive” (Fendley, 2018).   
 
The material saved from destruction includes not only that classified under national retention 
guidance but also company infrastructure:  
 
 “if a case was being looked at that had been worked on ten years ago say, I would 
 want to see records that showed the methods used had been properly validated and 
 the staff properly trained. So, those records need to be kept… and, since then, we’ve 
 had the near closure of Key Forensics. That was kept from liquidation by the police 
 forces propping it up while they found a buyer. There were quite a lot of meetings and 
 one was about transferring the material to FAL. Again, when it comes down to it, 
 there isn’t really another solution” (Fendley, 2018). 
 
The sale of highly sensitive forensic digital files could not be permitted, and so the FAL has 
been rebadged as the ‘archive of last resort’, i.e., where a private provider has no other means 
of keeping their archives secure upon leaving the forensic market (an eventuality that has 
occurred now on several occasions), they can be deposited with the FAL. It remains unclear 
what other archiving solutions may be acceptable before the ‘last resort’ is indeed resorted to, 
for instance, could a FSP merely exit the forensic market, but their parent company retain 
archives when continuing to operate in non-forensic markets? Could this parent company 
subsume such archives, and how is their provenance then monitored? If companies take-over 
other providers (again, a not infrequent occurrence), does this always include the safe transition 
of existing archives? Is a secure chain of custody of archives between companies ensured? The 
last twenty years have seen a variety of specialist FSPs whittled down to three big players 
(Eurofins, Cellmark and Key Forensics) conducting the bulk of both defence and prosecution 
scientific work, complemented by a few small, independent practitioners. However, the 
forensic science ‘market’ remains unstable and precarious, with very little ‘profit’ to be made, 
with even the big three warning of financial dire straits. Thus, the FSPs need to ensure that they 
are operating as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible:  
  
 “When the FSS closed, private providers… thought more sensibly about ‘what do we 
 do with all this stuff?’ because they had to pay for space to put it in or people to 
 manage it… So, now what happens is there is quite a keen requirement to try and get 
 rid of it as possible because the alternative is we have to keep it and pay for storage” 
 (Millington, 2018). 
 
The appointment of the Forensic Science Regulator has standardised operations for those firms, 
which can afford the high cost of accreditation, so some FSPs:  
 
 “have a standard operating procedure that deals with the return, retention and 
 destruction of items and materials that come to us. So, today, we have a process that’s 
 incredibly detailed about what happens to all the exhibits and what happens to all the 
 material” (Turner, 2018).   
 
The historic practice of returning physical items to police forces (clothing, weapons etc.) post-
examination, has thus expanded since the FSS closure to include the bulk of material created 
by scientists based at commercial FSPs. The additional burden placed on forces, to safeguard 
all forensic material in addition to property without additional funding, has created difficulties 
for cash-strapped forces: “If you take our current force-level store, we’ve got an entire room, 
5m x 20m, full of fridges and freezers (and Surrey’s a reasonably modest-sized force) … [with] 
a whole team of people running it” (Stephens, 2018). This material also requires an audit trail 
to evidence appropriate handling.10 According to NPCC guidelines FSPs should retain DNA 
extracts and case-files but a lack of clarity has led to reports of inappropriate destruction of 
even this potentially vital material. Indeed there is worrying anecdotal evidence, six years after 
the system was implemented, of a lack of clarity on the complex issue of who keeps what, by 
scientists: 
  
 “One particular force, when they were asked what they were doing with all their 
 materials, a high-up individual said: ‘oh, our provider keeps them’, and, actually, we 
 don’t. I don’t know what they’re doing. That’s a genuine thing that made the hair 
 stand up on the back of my neck…  That’s why I’ve been very nervous about what the 
 force is doing with this material” (Anon, 2018)  
 
Senior police staff reported evidence of inappropriate destruction of material by FSPs contrary 
to guidance: “Often items that ought not have been stored have been and items that we fully 
expected to be stored have been destroyed. It makes cold case investigation difficult and 
miscarriage of justice cases impossible to progress” (Alexander, 2018).  More clarity and 
oversight is thus required to ensure that FSPs are aware of their responsibilities and adhering 
to rules on retention and destruction.  
 
For cases that were investigated pre-2012, access to the FAL is severely restricted. Police 
forces and other Government investigating bodies11 can obtain material relating to their own 
cases, whilst the Crown Prosecution Service, the CCRC and the National Database Unit can 
access all archived material. Coroners are permitted to access material relating to cases under 
their jurisdiction. Private individuals – appellants and defence solicitors, for example – cannot 
access the archive, beyond making a ‘subject access request’, under data protection law. This 
will only oblige the FAL to disclose materials directly relating to the subject, without any data 
on other individuals, thus a very partial disclosure may take place. In order to obtain all the 
materials relating to their conviction, the FAL must refer the individual to the original 
investigating police force as the ‘owner’ and controller of the material. Additionally, FAL does 
                                                          
10 The storage of material is a complex process requiring appropriate handling.  The continuous deep-freeze of 
items for 30 years, for example, requires an audit trail evidencing regular and routine thermometer checks; 
systems must be in place to avoid an accusation of contamination in storage. 
11 Including HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and replacement 
bodies and the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). 
not provide any scientific advice or support for cold cases or historic reviews of convicted 
cases, nor will it: 
 
 “provide a list of all material held in relation to a case or make recommendations on 
 potential avenues of additional scientific work. Forces should request the pertinent 
 case-files to review themselves (or ask their current forensic provider to do so) and 
 then contact the archive to dispatch the required items” (FAL, 2018).   
 
Where the FSS was a dynamic centre for scientific endeavour, FAL is a museum, which has 
no remit beyond cataloguing and containment: 
 
“the Government must recognize the additional costs being incurred by public bodies 
in obtaining external scientific advice to support requests for archived material. There 
would be merit in FAL employing scientific experts to provide that service if overall 
public savings could be made and the CJS better served.” (House of Commons 2013: 
para 99) 
 
Following efficiencies made during the cataloguing and destruction process, the annual budget 
for FAL has halved from £1.95 million in 2012 to £1million in 2016. The archive employs just 
seven archivists and a manager working on one site. However, there remains evidence of some 
concern around who should be paying for the FAL.12 The safe retention of historic material is 
clearly valued, with the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee specifically 
referencing the need to investigate and remedy miscarriages of justice as one important 
justification:  
 
 “The archives are important for a number of reasons, including cold case reviews 
 (unsolved crimes where the investigation trail has gone cold) and investigating 
 potential miscarriages of justice. Keeping materials and samples enables forensic 
 scientists to re-examine materials from old unsolved crimes using new forensic 
                                                          
12 The 2016 Review recommended that FAL should continue to be funded by the Home Office but noted “a 
recognised principle” that the primary users of a service could be expected to pay for the service they receive. 
Police forces might therefore be required to contribute in future (Home Office, 2016: p6). 
 
 methods. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) has stated that ‘there is 
 no time limit on miscarriages of justice’ and that ‘with continued advances in 
 scientific techniques, it is impossible to say that a conviction which appears safe today 
 may appear less so in ten or twenty years’” (House of Commons, 2011: para 92). 
 
Despite this, the Home Office Review of FAL in April 2016 concluded that, by 2021, “the 
costs of maintaining and running FAL will no longer represent value for money.” (Home 
Office, 2016: 5) suggesting that by that time:  
 
 “all of the material FAL holds with retention periods of 3 and 7 years would have 
 been destroyed. This would be an opportune date at which to consider an alternative 
 provider to archive and provide access to the remaining case files and material with 
 30-year retention periods” (ibid).   
 
Even by 2021, however, the “diminished” archive will still be substantial: two thirds of a 
million case-files (plus any additional archives added as a ‘last resort’). A Government 
assessment of costs should also consider wider implications to the criminal justice system of 
closing the FAL. A tempting solution may be to order the return all remaining material at FAL 
to the original investigating forces, which are already storing post-2012 material. Yet there is 
a surprising lack of awareness around this possibility and police forces interviewed for this 
research have not been consulted yet on the potential impact “we work on a four-year medium-
term financial plan and we haven’t made provision [for the intake of any additional material] 
in our current plan” (Stephens, 2018). In fact, all police staff interviewed for this research were 
unaware:  
 
 “and that’s interesting, specifically when you’re considering the Forensic Science 
 Regulator’s requirement for forces to be accredited in their handling of evidential 
 materials, a quality standard we have to have wrapped up by 2020. Within that there’s 
 going to be some handling and probably storage requirements [for ‘live’ 
 investigations] coming out of that. I can imagine that placing an additional burden on 
 policing” (Bayliss, 2018).   
 
That burden could be increased significantly if a decision to order repatriation of pre-2012 
material was additionally imposed on already overstretched forces:  
  “my view is that, if the FAL was to be closed, the Forensic Regulator should get 
 involved at that point and effectively have an audit of the facilities available at the 
 police forces… There are guidelines for accreditation for different evidence types, so, 
 if we make a national decision to close the archive, we should have the same 
 framework in place. [Forces] would have to demonstrate they have suitable facilities 
 and checks and balances in place to do it properly. Otherwise, we’re just pushing 
 responsibility and not really… policing it” (Millington, 2018). 
 
There thus remain significant concerns about the police capacity to retain forensic materials, 
and scientists interviewed for this research said a forensic case file would “never” be released 
in original format to investigating forces in the FSS era. They are now. Key swabs and samples 
would “never” be returned to police forces. They are now. The FSS had the ‘luxury’ of having 
few pressures on storage (and business demands to save costs and increase profits) and, at a 
time of paper-based indexing, while there were a few high-profile failings, by and large, 
practitioners report confidence that items held at the FSS would be found at the FSS. Scientists 
tended to keep case materials, and there was confidence that material deposited with the FSS 
scientists would be retained safely, in appropriate conditions – confidence not shared by those 
searching for the items returned to police forces. While the FAL has nearly completed barcode 
cataloguing which has brought the archiving of scientific material created pre-2012 into the 
21st century. However, the safekeeping of scientific material created post-2012 presents a 
disjointed landscape. The long-term viability of the FAL depends upon the frequent (every 5 
years) renewal of the service-level agreement between FAL and the Home Office, which 
currently runs until 2022. This renewal cannot presently be assured (particularly as the lease 
on the Birmingham premises due for renewal in 2021 may increase costs and alter cost-
efficiency calculations).  
 
Issues Arising from Confusion Regarding Retention 
Guidance on policy for the retention of materials is best found in NPCC version 2.1, yet 
information supplied by forces shows a picture of confusion across England and Wales, with 
forces following ad hoc in-house policies, or outdated guidance with other aims in mind. There 
is woeful ignorance of the current guidance that should be followed which: “has not been 
widely enough articulated and, with all of the plethora [of guidance], how on earth is someone 
going to wade through the pertinent points of that in terms of retention…” (Bayliss 2018).   
 It is of significant concern that ten forces (nearly a quarter) reported they only comply with 
MoPI, imposing a significantly longer period of retention on forces, which will create an 
unintended archive problem. Yet it is not simply the time burden, which is concerning here: to 
apply MoPI to decision-making around the retention of physical material post-conviction in 
case of an appeal, is clearly misguided. The purpose of MoPI seems to have been lost on police 
administrators answering this FOI request. An additional eight forces responded to say they 
use a combination of MoPI and CPIA. Again, this confusion is worrying: different guidance 
and codes of practices, written for different purposes, are being conflated and confused, 
running the risk of officers being unclear as to the responsibilities placed upon them and, 
unwittingly perhaps, destroying a wrongly convicted person’s chance of challenging their 
conviction.  
 
In the most serious category of offences, NPCC 2.1 (and Forensics21) direct police forces and 
forensic science providers to keep material for a 30-year period before review. However, the 
CPIA direction is until the time of prisoner’s release, a significant distinction given the increase 
in sentencing, which began with Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.13 The CPIA is 
relevant to a central question: distinguishing material from paper-based information, as 
opposed to MoPI, which, in both spirit and wording, covers information gathered for 
intelligence purposes and not physical material. The adherence to MoPI by half of the forces 
exposes a fundamental misapplication of guidance never intended to assist the CACD. In 
addition, MoPI asks for a judgement of a case on the grounds of public protection or violence. 
The former demands retention for 100 years whilst the latter only 10 years and an extra layer 
of unnecessary confusion demanding an individual’s discernment when considering how long 
to retain, for example, a prisoner’s jumper or victim’s clothing.  
 
Twelve forces referred to Forensics21 as their guidance despite the Home Office identifying in 
2016 that this should be replaced, which it was in 2018 (Home Office, 2016: Recommendation 
3). The Forensics21 policy is confusing as it also includes timeframes for Forensic Science 
Providers, which fall short of CPIA requirements and, in turn, are not in line with NPCC 2.1. 
                                                          
13 “A comparison of tariff lengths imposed by judges and then endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice before the 
2003 Act came into force with the period shortly afterwards suggest that tariffs then increased by at least 20% or 
so… What significantly drove up sentences thereafter was the decision by [then Home Secretary] Jack Straw to 
increase the tariff for murder with a knife from its previous 15 years to the 25-year minimum. This has affected 
sentence length across the board, with consequential increases in tariff lengths” (Samuels, 2018).    
Four forces14 reported that the decision on what material to keep and for how long was on a 
case-by-case basis. For example, the City of London Police retains material in the most serious 
category of cases for 50-100 years, more than the current 30-year policy but justified this in 
interview by virtue of their adequate storage space. Leicestershire said they keep material for 
only six years with no obvious rationale for the time-frame; Merseyside makes a distinction 
between evidence which has been used at trial, which it keeps for 100 years (exceeding 
requirements set down under NPCC 2.1) and unused material, gathered during the 
investigation, which is reviewed on a case-by-case basis with encouragement to return material 
to owners for reasons of space. Warwickshire & West Mercia’s policy is baffling: digital 
forensics are kept for 100 years, DNA profiles for 30 years but all other material is either not 
covered in their response or is destroyed after six months.   
 
Problems with this national picture fall into two key groups: firstly, the policy of archiving 
retained material held by commercial FSPs in the event of the exit of the FSP from the market-
place remains unclear; secondly, the bulk of items generated by scientific work post-2012 are 
now returned to the investigating force. The greatest criticism from those working within the 
criminal justice system has been of in-force stores, which have repeatedly failed to retain 
property securely and now have the additional burden of responsibility for scientific samples 
requiring specialist storage. There also appears to be a lack of planning around the future 
running of the FAL and a worrying lack of any oversight of retention/storage of materials by 
investigating forces.  
 
Resolving retention issues 
The ‘system’ for retaining, storing, and accessing material for post-conviction challenges to 
convictions, needs to be uniform, transparent, robust and impartial.15 NPCC 2.1 has started the 
process of creating such a system, and should be disseminated widely to all forces. For the 
system to be successful, the following questions need clear answers, with little room for 
discretionary decision-making. The system should also be included into HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary audits, which should now extend to include police property and scientific stores 
and ensure that forces are following NPCC 2.1 as a minimum retention policy. Results from 
these audits should inform the Home Office in its 2022 review of the Forensic Archive. 
                                                          
14 Cleveland, Lancashire, Northamptonshire and Staffordshire 
15 The issues surrounding the disclosure of materials post-conviction is dealt with comprehensively by the 
authors in: McCartney & Shorter (2019) and is thus not dealt with here.  
 What should be retained?  
Physical size, ownership and the value of an item, among other things, preclude the retention 
of all possible materials involved in a police investigation, While some forces have reported 
keeping bulky and expensive items such as a car, scaffolding poles, and even a shed for more 
than a decade in police storage, these reports are exceptional.16 Equally, items of sentimental 
value are a difficult area for an officer trying to balance the needs of the victim or family, 
alongside criminal justice requirements and clear national guidelines are required to avoid 
confusion. Practical steps could and should be taken if an item is to be returned: forensic taping 
or swabbing which effectively lifts any evidential value onto a smaller, more easily managed 
item which could be retained for future testing: “There are going to be cases where, for example 
a watch has a thumbprint but the victim wants that watch back. If you’ve lifted the print, there’s 
no reason why you can’t give it back” (Bayliss, 2018).  
 
Although thoughtful compromises are needed when balancing the needs of different parties it 
should also be noted that it is impossible for any accurate prediction to be made about what 
material might usefully be retained for a new scientific technique, which has not yet been 
discovered. The retention of material post-conviction is paramount for anybody striving to have 
their wrongful conviction overturned, who may need to rely upon new scientific techniques or 
interpretation. It is also essential for any cold case reviews that need to be undertaken. As a 
matter of principal all material must be retained, rather than a subjective and partial decision 
being made by the investigating officer as to what might be deemed ‘relevant’:  
  
 “In the future, we’re going to have more people in prison, or not in prison, because 
 the testing that’s been done is so restricted… it’s imperative you keep everything 
 because you might need to test it and it was never looked at to start with because the 
 strategy was wrong…. or technology and interpretation move on… it’s more 
 important now than it’s ever been (Millington, 2018).   
 
NPCC 2.1 recommends storage for 30 years, 7 years and 3 years in cases of major crime, 
serious crime and volume crime respectively. While this benefits from being a clear policy, it 
should be amended to reflect the increase in sentencing severity which has occurred over the 
                                                          
16 Constabularies of Wiltshire, City of London Police and Surrey. 
past decade and update policy to reflect this, so that all material in a life sentence case should 
be retained during the life of the sentenced person, or 30 years, whichever is longer. 
Interviewees pointed to the benefit of this “simplified landscape” (Bayliss, 2018), claiming that 
trained archivists with a detailed knowledge of the national guidance, could then advise police 
officers with a specialist knowledge of an individual case, which may influence what should 
be kept. Prisoners and their legal representatives should not have to second-guess the capricious 
practices of individual forces: “The key is to preserve the integrity of evidence for the greater 
public good. That’s paramount because… if material isn’t stored correctly… confidence in the 
system will drop” (Bayliss, 2018).  
 
In addition, while not dealt with directly here, there are ongoing issues in England and Wales 
with the retention policy for audio recordings of Crown Court proceedings. A policy on 
retaining recordings of proceedings should mirror the minimum retention period for physical 
and scientific material set-out in NPCC 2.1 (or subsequent versions), and trial transcripts should 
be made freely available in cases where a miscarriage of justice is alleged. 
 
Where should materials be retained? 
The current storage landscape within police forces is disjointed, inadequately resourced and, at 
times, poorly managed. The most frequently reported concern during this research was forces’ 
ability to store and safeguard material post-conviction, a role expanded post-2012 to include 
scientific material without additional budget. When the FAL was created robust cataloguing 
began: “I had to bring in additional staff with an additional grant from the Home Office. That 
took a year; to barcode all the paper records and the majority of the material, but not the slides, 
which we’re still going through.” (Fendley 2018). Now this investment has been made, it would 
be a retrograde step to split up this barcoded, catalogued collection. An orderly transition to a 
post-FAL era, must be prioritised, with careful consultation of police forces, scientists and 
interested parties. That consultation should also consider property stores within police forces 
to assess whether the stores, candidly described by police staff as “creaking” and “bursting at 
the seams” (Stephens 2018) are sustainable. The Home Office should also begin a period of 
consultation over the future of the FAL and consider whether the archive should be expanded 
to include scientific material from post-2012 cases removing responsibility from forces. A 
scoping exercise should consider whether property and scientific stores, managed by dedicated 
archivists, should be created on a national, regional or force basis.  
 
Conclusion 
The police retention and storage of material, post-conviction, is an opaque, unaudited 
landscape, which is not fit for purpose. Research into the adherence to guidelines has revealed 
a woeful picture, with just two forces citing the current guidance, which were written for this 
specific purpose by the NPCC, providing clarity for all forces nationally. Some forces have a 
policy to destroy material before these time periods expire, others keep material for 100 years 
(incurring an unnecessary storage burden). Still others keep material for the length of the 
sentence and others decide what to keep on a case-by-case basis. The variation in retention 
practices demands the need for the adoption, monitoring and enforcement of the uniform 
national policy, NPCC 2.1. Respondents may not have been aware of this new guidance, given 
its novelty at the time of the FOI request, though the correct reporting by two forces suggests 
they should have been. NPCC 2.1 is an immensely helpful document to police forces and FSPs. 
More should be done now to promote effective dissemination to all forces, ensuring that every 
member of staff who may need to decide what should be retained post-conviction is 
appropriately informed and trained. 
 
The retention of scientific material has also changed following the closure of the FSS, adding 
to confusion. The long-term viability of the FAL is unclear yet the justification for ensuring all 
material is retained is clear:  
 
 “The past is the past and people didn’t know about advances in forensics. It’s been a 
 lack of knowledge and understanding that has led to things not being kept but we’re in 
 the position now, and I feel really strongly about this, where we should be keeping a 
 lot of this stuff for the future” (Turner, 2018).  
 
A successful appeal against wrongful conviction will most often demand fresh evidence, which 
may be derived from previous unused material, re-investigation of material with new 
techniques or reappraisal in the light of new understanding. The same applies to the re-
investigation of cold cases. None of this will be possible without material being obtained at the 
outset from crime scene, victims and suspects, unconstrained by the narrow presumptive 
strategies encouraged by the economy-centred streamlined forensic reporting (see McCartney 
2019; Edmond et al 2018). Further, the reluctance by profit-driven FSPs to provide costly 
storage, coupled with a duty on police forces to become the storage solution for post-2012 
cases, may impede the criminal justice system in ensuring (delayed) justice.  
 As well as ensuring that there is proper auditing of retention and storage by police forces, to 
ensure oversight and transparency, sanctions for improper retention and storage should be 
considered as part of this regulatory regime. Currently the only means to identify breaches of 
a Code of Practice is via the Independent Office for Police Conduct17 or via the Court of 
Appeal, though an appeal based on the destruction of relevant material which, arguably, should 
have been retained post-conviction, has never been pursued. This is plainly unsatisfactory and 
justice demands that we accept that ultimately retention of materials is fundamental to the fair 
operation of our criminal justice system: 
  
 “It’s about the integrity of our system that we should do it (properly). If we accept 
 that miscarriages of justices occur – because otherwise what’s the point of the CCRC 
 - those mistakes need to be thoroughly investigated. Therefore, it’s a cost that we 
 should incur, no matter what” (Maddocks, 2018). 
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Table 1. Interviewees. 
 
Name  Postion held Date of interview 
Alexander, Tracy Director of Forensic Services, City of London 
Police 
May 2018 
Bayliss, Helen Head of Quality Services, Surrey Police May 2018 
Berlin, Sally Director of Casework Operations, Criminal Cases 
Review Commission 
May 2018 
Christopher, 
Stephen 
Senior Lecturer, Criminal Investigations, De 
Monteforte University  
March 2018 
Devitt, John Senior Policing Oversight Specialist and former 
Senior Detective 
June 2018 
Eady, Dennis Professor of Law, Cardiff Law School April 2018 
Fenley, Alison Executive Director, Forensic Archive Ltd  May 2018 
Lekamwattage, 
Gihan 
City of London Police Crime Scene Manager April 2018 
Maddocks, Glyn Defence solicitor April 2018  
McDonagh 
Matthew 
Barrister June 2018 
Merchant, Maslen Legal Executive, Hadgkiss, Hughes & Beale April 2018 
Millington, Joanne Senior Forensic Scientist, Millington Hingley Ltd April 2018 
Newby, Mark Quality Solicitors April 2018 
Samuels, John QC, Retired Circuit Judge. July 2018 
Stephens, Gavin Chief Constable, Surrey & Sussex Police May 2018 
Thomas, Des Honorary Visiting Professor, School of Law & 
Ethics, Cardiff University 
April 2018 
Turner, Cathy Scientific Adviser on Cold Cases at 
Eurofins Forensic Services 
April 2018 
Anonymous Forensic manager, Metropolitan Police May 2018 
  
 
 
Table 2: Summary of National Retention Policies 
 
National 
Policy 
Guidance 
for: 
Definition of 
Evidence Type 
Retention period 
CPIA Police Forces All material & 
objects where 
relevant 
All convicted crimes: till prisoner is released 
from custody or on completion of Appeal or 
CCRC review if released. 
MoPI Police Forces Police records & 
information only 
Group 11 (public protection) offences - 100th 
year of age of prisoner;  
Group 2 (other violent, sexual or serious) 
offences - reviewed after 10 years;  
Group 3 (all other) offences – reviewed after 3 
years 
Forensics21 Police Forces Information & 
material Objects 
All crime types:  
Forces are referred to follow CPIA 
 
Forensics 21 Forensic 
Service 
Providers 
All case material Major Crime2 – 30 years  
Serious Crime3 – 7 years 
Volume Crime4 – 3 years 
 
NPCC V2.1 Police & 
FSPs 
All case material Major Crime – 30 years  
Serious Crime – 6 years 
Volume Crime – 3 years 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 College of Policing (2018) 
2 Major crime: Actual or suspected murder; Manslaughter; Other homicide; Terrorism; Kidnap where a threat to 
life or risk of significant harm exists; Blackmail; Product contamination; Rape by a stranger which forms part of 
a series; Armed robbery with significant aggravating factors. (Leicestershire Constabulary, 2011). 
3 Serious crime: conduct which (a) involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is 
conducted by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose or (b) the offence or one of the 
offences is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and has no previous 
convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more 
(College of Policing, 2018).  
4Volume crime: any crime which, through its sheer volume, has a significant impact on the community and the 
ability of the local police to tackle it. Volume crime often includes priority crimes such as street robbery, 
burglary and vehicle-related criminality, but can also apply to criminal damage or assaults (College of Policing, 
2018).  
Table 3: Summary of FOI Responses Tabulated by Force and Policy 
Force CPIA MoPI Forensics21  NPCC2.1 Own Policy 
Avon & Somerset 
 
x 
 
 
 
Bedfordshire 
 
x 
 
 
 
Cambridgeshire  
 
x 
 
 
 
Cheshire 
   
 Tier 1&2 10 years 
Tier 3 100 years 
City of London 
   
 Volume crime cases: 7 
years (unconvicted) or 10 
years (convicted)  
Serious offences: 50-100 
years regardless of 
conviction status. 
Cleveland 
 
x 
 
 Labs return all material to 
force.  SIO decides on case 
by case basis what to retain 
in line with MoPI & PACE. 
Cumbria x x 
 
 
 
Derbyshire x x 
 
 25 years retention if life 
sentence. Duration of appeal 
if in progress. 
Devon & Cornwall 
 
x 
 
 
 
Dorset x x 
 
 
 
Durham 
 
x 
 
 
 
Dyfed-Powys  
  
x  
 
Essex   x    
Gloucestershire x x 
 
 
 
Greater Manchester x x 
 
 
 
Gwent  x 
  
 
 
Hampshire 
 
x 
 
 
 
Hertfordshire 
  
x  
 
Humberside x  x   
Kent x x x  
 
Lancashire 
 
x 
 
 Physical evidence retained 
on a “case by case basis”. 
Evidence Related Property 
Policy & Scientific Support 
Policy both refer & are both 
under review. 
Leicestershire 
  
x  Generally, 6 years  
Lincolnshire  
 
x x  
 
Merseyside 
   
 Physical material used in 
evidence retained for length 
of sentence as minimum. 
Unused material disposed of 
or retained according OIC 
“Currently officers are 
encouraged to authorise such 
items to be either returned to 
the owner or disposed of. 
Force CPIA MoPI Forensics21  NPCC2.1 Own Policy 
The rationale for this action, 
is that storage space is 
finite.” 
Metropolitan Police  x 
  
 
 
Norfolk  x 
  
 
 
North Yorkshire x  x  Material sent to Forensic 
Service Providers are 
returned to the force, except 
those which are 
perishable/body fluids/bio 
hazard which are destroyed 
after 6 months & DNA 
extracts which are retained 
by the lab. 
Northamptonshire 
  
x  Homicide: case by case. 
Defence agreement in 
writing. 
DNA & Blood Swabs & 
fingerprints: 30 years 
Rape: 7 years 
Others: case by case 
Northumbria x x 
 
 
 
North Wales 
   
x 
 
Nottinghamshire x x 
 
 
 
South Wales x 
  
 
 
South Yorkshire x  x  See North Yorkshire. 
Staffordshire 
 
x x x SIO5 discretion on a case by 
case basis. 
Suffolk x 
  
 
 
Surrey Police  x 
  
 
 
Sussex  x x x  + DNA & Protection of 
Freedoms Act. 
Thames Valley Police  
 
x 
 
 
 
Warwickshire  
   
 DNA extracts retained 30 
yrs; 
Road traffic toxicology & 
post PCR (DNA) lab 
products & biohazard 
exhibits – 6 mths 
All data (digital forensics) is 
stored for 100 years. 
West Mercia      As for Warwickshire. 
West Midlands 
   
 Length of sentence or maybe 
longer for murder.  
West Yorkshire x  x  See North Yorkshire. 
Wiltshire x x 
 
 
 
Total 20 22 12 2  
                                                          
5 Senior Investigating Officer; the individual who led the original investigation. 
 
